Fog-enhanced IoT (Internet of Things) is a fast-growing technology in which many firms and industries are currently investing to develop their own real-time and low latency scenarios. Compared with the traditional IoT, fog-enhanced IoT can offer a higher level of efficiency and stronger security by providing local data pre-processing, filtering, and forwarding mechanisms. However, fog-enhanced IoT faces some security and privacy challenges, since fog nodes are deployed at the network edge and may not be fully trustable. In this paper, we present a new privacy-preserving subset aggregation scheme, called PPSA, in fog-enhanced IoT scenarios, that enables a query user to gain the sum of data from a subset of IoT devices. To identify the subset, inner product similarity of the normalized vectors in the query user side and each IoT device is securely computed. If the inner product is greater than the user's specified threshold, IoT device's data will be privately aggregated to form the final response. To successfully launch privacy-preserving subset aggregation in the proposed scheme, we employ the Paillier homomorphic encryption to encrypt user's attribute vector, similarity threshold, IoT end-devices' data, as well as the intermediate results. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first one to address the privacy-preserving subset aggregation in fog-enhanced IoT. We analyze and extensively evaluate the efficiency and security of the proposed PPSA scheme, and the detailed analysis and results indicate that our proposed PPSA scheme can practically achieve privacy-preserving subset aggregation with significant communication and computational cost saving.
I. INTRODUCTION
IoT (Internet of Things) has recently attracted considerable attentions from both academia and industry, as it can make a significant impact on every aspect of our daily lives, e.g., offering a wide range of services from smart home [1] , smart building [2] , smart health care [3] , to smart grid [4] . To be more precise, IoT is a network of interrelated computing devices, namely IoT devices, each device is equipped with the capability of sensing the surrounding data. Besides, owning to the communicating capability, IoT devices can also report the sensed data to a third party, e.g, a cloud server, for further storing and processing the data.
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Despite all the advantages involved with IoT, IoT still suffers from some security, privacy, and efficiency-related shortcomings [5] . For instance, as the number of IoT devices grows, more data are needed to be transmitted to the third party with higher frequency. Consequently, the underlying infrastructure would face big data issues in communication bandwidth and latency. To address this challenge, we can enhance IoT infrastructure with fog computing [6] to substantially decrease the processing delay, provide real-time computation, reduce the volume of the reported data, and secure networking services.
Essentially, fog computing extends the data processing capabilities of cloud computing by carrying out IoT-enabled applications at the edge of the network, with more real-time response. The goal of the fog-computing based IoT is to enhance IoT by taking care of reliable sensing, analytics, processing, and control at the network edge so that the resource allocation and bandwidth challenges can be solved [7] . Furthermore, due to strong computational and communication capabilities, fog nodes can support advanced cryptographic algorithms and privacy-preserving techniques to resolve the security issues. On top of that, fog computing could also be integrated with information-centric Internet to provide more efficient performance in data transmission, caching, and security as a possible future trend [8] , [9] .
In this paper, we focus on addressing a new privacypreserving problem, i.e., how to achieve privacy-preserving subset aggregation in fog-enhanced IoT. The problem for a set of IoT devices I = {I 1 , I 2 , · · · , I N }, two fog nodes FN 1 and FN 2 , and the query user is defined as follows. Each IoT device I i ∈ I , which is characterized with a normalized attribute vector V i = (v i1 , v i2 , · · · , v ik ) to indicate its status, will periodically prepare sensed data D i . A query user holds a query -also denoted as a normalized attribute vector U = (u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u k ) and a threshold value τ and intends to query a subset I ⊆ I to compute their sum aggregation I i ∈I D i , where each I i 's attribute vector V i is similar to the query U , i.e., the inner product U · V i ≥ τ . The problem can fit for many realistic IoT application scenarios, however it also faces some privacy challenges [10] . Therefore, in this paper, aiming at addressing the privacy challenges, we propose a privacy-preserving subset aggregation scheme, called PPSA, for fog-enhanced IoT scenario. Specifically, the contributions of this paper are three-fold:
• Proposing a privacy-preserving subset aggregation for fog computing-enhanced IoT. To this end, Paillier homomorphic cryptosystem [11] has been employed to support the aggregation process in the proposed PPSA.
To the best of our knowledge, PPSA is the first one to address the privacy-preserving subset aggregation in fog-enhanced IoT.
• Achieving a different level of privacy preservation in the user's query, the IoT devices' responses, and the intermediate results among the fog nodes in the fog layer.
• Performing thorough analysis and experiments to evaluate the performance of PPSA for each step from query submission to response recovery in terms of communication overhead and computational cost. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce our system model, security model, and design goal. We describe some preliminaries in Section III. In Section IV, we present our PPSA scheme, followed by security analysis and performance evaluation in Section V and Section VI, respectively. Related work is discussed in Section VII. Finally, we draw our conclusion in Section VIII.
II. MODELS AND DESIGN GOAL
In this section, we formalize our system model, security model, and related assumptions. We further identify our design goal. The list of the used symbols in the proposed scheme can be found in Table 1 . Fig. 1 depicts our system model that builds on a fog computing-based IoT. Concretely, it mainly consists of a set of IoT devices I = {I 1 , I 2 , · · · , I N } arranged within the end-device layer, two fog devices FN 1 and FN 2 deployed at the fog layer, a service provider, and a query user who aims at submitting subset aggregation queries over IoT devices.
A. SYSTEM MODEL
• Service Provider: an entity deployed on top of the fog layer, which initializes the system by generating the public key pk and private key sk of Paillier cryptosystem as an underlying encryption algorithm employed in our PPSA scheme. The pk is publicly made available for all entities present in the system. Conversely, the private key sk will only be accessible by the fog node FN 1 , which is responsible to determine the similarity U · V i of two scaled normalized vectors U and V i from the query user and IoT device I i , respectively.
• Query User: In our model, the query user queries a subset of IoT devices I ⊆ I in order to obtain the aggregate sum value of their prepared data D, i.e. D = I ∈I D .
Before launching the query, the user should specify the attribute vector U , threshold value τ , and random value α.
To identify subset I , we need to compute the similarity of vector U and the corresponding vector V i of each IoT device I i . To this end, scalar dot product of both normalized attribute vectors U and V i is computed as a similarity measure. If the dot product value U · V i is greater than the specified threshold τ , IoT device I i will contribute to the result of aggregate sum. The user submits the encrypted values of U , τ , and α to fog device FN 2 , i.e., E(U ) = E(u 1 ), E(u 2 ), · · · , E(u k ) , E(τ ), and E(α), respectively. It is worth mentioning that α is a contaminator for anonymizing the final response from fog node FN 1 .
• IoT Devices: a set of IoT devices I = {I 1 , I 2 , · · · , I N } are deployed at the end-device layer. Each device I i ∈ I is equipped with both sensing and communication capabilities, which allows them to collect the data and communicate with each other as well. In our model, we consider each IoT device I i ∈ I periodically reports its prepared data D i to the fog layer. The query user intends to query a subset I ⊆ I of IoT devices whose attribute vector V i is similar to his/her own attribute vector U with respect to threshold value τ . If U .V i −τ > 0, D i of IoT device I i will be aggregated to form the final response.
• Fog Devices: Both fog nodes FN 1 and FN 2 are deployed at the fog layer. FN 2 receives the query from the query user and periodically collects the responses from the IoT devices. To achieve efficient privacy-preserving subset aggregation, FN 2 collaborates with FN 1 delivering the final response to the query user. As the data values of IoT devices periodically change, the user's query is re-evaluated constantly based on the previous parameters unless a new query is submitted by the user. Note that, our system model considers two collaborative fog nodes. As a result, our system will be failed once there is just one fog node, but this condition rarely appears. For the step-wise details of Fig. 1 , including system initialization, user's query generation, IoT device's response, response aggregation at the fog layer, and result recovery at the user's side, we will further explain them in Section IV.
B. SECURITY MODEL
In our security model, we consider that a remote attacker cannot exploit the vulnerabilities to take control of affected devices to inspect or modify the reported data D i or attribute vector V i for all or a subset of IoT devices I = {I 1 , I 2 , · · · , I N }. Moreover, there is no collusion among fog nodes and between fog nodes FN 2 and other entities, otherwise, the private key can be misused to decrypt the traffic to access the user's query, attribute vectors U and V i , and even prepared data D i . Finally, we assume that the fog nodes and IoT devices are honest-but-curious, i.e., parties follow the protocol honestly, but they may retain the exchanged-messages to extract additional information about the user's query, IoT device's data, or his/her attribute vector. Note that, we do not consider the cyber/physical attacks, e.g., Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack and physical attacks on IoT devices and fog devices, in our current security model. Although, PPSA's resistance to these types of attacks can protect the IoT device's identity and can effectively prevent from data leakage, defense against these attacks are beyond the scope of this paper and will be discussed in future work. Nevertheless, applying some mature software/hardware security solutions such as digital certificates, message as well as device authentication, access control, or Trusted Platform Module (TPM) are not complicated.
C. DESIGN GOAL
Considering the aforementioned system model and security model, our design goal is to propose a privacy-preserving subset aggregation (PPSA) scheme in fog-enhanced IoT. Precisely, the following two objectives should be achieved:
• The proposed scheme should be privacy-preserving. In the proposed PPSA, the user's query, i.e., the normalized vector U and threshold value τ should be privacypreserving. Moreover, the participating IoT devices in calculating the subset aggregation, i.e., the I , cannot be obtained by the user. No one can access the prepared data D i and attribute vector V i of IoT device I i . Both fog nodes FN 1 and FN 2 cannot determine any of the user's query, IoT device's data, attribute vector, and the subset I . Note that, to protect the final result from being revealed to FN 1 , a random value α should be chosen by the user, and its encrypted equivalent will be uploaded during query submission.
• The proposed scheme should be efficient. With the fog nodes deployed at the fog layer, we need to keep the communication costs among the IoT devices, fog nodes, and user as low as possible. Consequently, in the proposed PPSA, we aim to achieve O(1) communication-efficiency between fog node FN 1 and the user, as well as O(k +1) between IoT devices and fog node FN 2 , i.e., the total length k = |V i | of the attribute vector V i and one prepared data D i for each IoT device I i .
III. PRELIMINARIES
Since we will employ the Paillier Encryption as the building block of our proposed scheme, in this section, we will recall its description and homomorphic properties. The Paillier Encryption is an additive homomorphic cryptosystem and has recently been in widespread use for privacy-preserving computation offloading. Specifically, it is composed of three algorithms, i.e., key generation KeyGen(κ), encryption Enc(pk, m) and decryption Dec(sk, c).
• KeyGen(κ) : Given a security parameter κ ∈ Z + , large prime numbers p, q, p , and q are selected such that p = 2p + 1, q = 2q + 1 and |p| = |q| = κ. Let n = pq and λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1) = 2p q . In addition, define a function L(x) = x−1 n and randomly choose a generator g ∈ Z * n 2 . Then, let µ = L(g λ mod n 2 ) −1 mod n and KeyGen(κ) outputs the public key pk = (n, g) and private key sk = (λ, µ). • Enc(pk, m) : Given the public key pk and a message m ∈ Z n , the message m can be encrypted as c = E(m) = g m · r n mod n 2 , where r ∈ Z * n is a random number. • Dec(sk, c) : Given the private key sk and a ciphertext c = E(m), the message m can be recovered as m = L(c λ mod n 2 ) · µ mod n. The Paillier Encryption satisfies the following two homomorphic properties.
• Homomorphic Addition: Given two ciphertexts E(m 1 ) and E(m 2 ), we have E(m 1 ) · E(m 2 ) = E(m 1 + m 2 ).
• Homomorphic Multiplication: Given a ciphertext E(m 1 ) and a plaintext m 2 ∈ Z n , we have E(m 1 ) m 2 = E(m 1 · m 2 ).
• Self-Blindness: Given ciphertext E(m) and random value r ∈ Z * n , we have E(m) · r n → E(m). This means that the Paillier Encryption can convert a valid ciphertext into another indistinguishable yet valid one for privacy-preserving purposes.
IV. OUR PROPOSED PPSA SCHEME
In this section, we will present our PPSA scheme, which is built on the Paillier Encryption and mainly consists of five parts: i) system initialization, ii) query generation at the query user, iii) query response at IoT devices, iv) response aggregation at the fog layer; and v) result recovery at the end of the process on the user's side. Fig. 2 outlines the detailed execution steps of the proposed PPSA scheme.
A. SYSTEM INITIALIZATION
In the system initialization, we assume the service provider will bootstrap the whole system. Given the security parameter κ, the service provider generates the public key pk = (n, g) and private key sk = (λ, µ) of Paillier homomorphic encryption, where for two randomly generated prime numbers p and q, we have |p| = |q| = κ, n = pq, and λ = lcm(p − 1, q − 1). Moreover, for random integer g ∈ Z * n 2 and defined function L(x) = x−1 n , µ can be defined as µ = L(g λ mod n 2 ) −1 mod n. Then, the service provider makes the public key pk accessible to all participants in the system, meanwhile the private key sk is just available to the fog node FN 1 .
B. QUERY GENERATION AT THE USER'S SIDE
Given a user's attribute vector U = (u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u k ), and threshold value τ , user intends to execute an aggregation sum query over the prepared data D i of each IoT device I i in a subset I ⊂ I . To indicate the subset I , the inner product of U and the attribute vector
To satisfy the privacy preservation requirement, the user will not disclose any information about U and the threshold τ to the fog devices and the IoT devices. Hence, the user will employ the publicly available pk to encrypt U and τ , i.e., E(U ) = (E(u 1 ), E(u 2 ), · · · , E(u k )) and E(τ ), indicated as the step one in Fig. 2 . Concretely, Algorithm 1 demonstrates the query generation at the user's side.
C. QUERY RESPONSE AT IOT DEVICES
In the next step, the fog node FN 2 will receive the encrypted query from the user (the step one) and broadcast E(U ) to all IoT devices at the end-device layer (the step two). Each IoT Algorithm 1 Query Generation Input: Vector <U> = (u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u k ), τ , α |U | = k Output: Vector <EU> = E(u 1 , u 2 , · · · , E(u k )), Eτ , Eα 1: for each u j ∈ U do 1 ≤ j ≤ |U | = k, ENC: Paillier encryption method.
2:
EU .ADD(j) ← PAILLIER.ENC(u j )
device I i with attribute vector V i and prepared data D i will compute E(U .V i ) as follows:
Finally, each IoT device I i will return back both E(U .V i ) and E(D i ) to fog node FN 2 , as indicated by the step three in Fig. 2 . Algorithm 2 details the response of each IoT device I i .
D. RESPONSE AGGREGATION AT THE FOG LAYER
Upon receiving E(U .V i ) and E(D i ) from each IoT device I i ∈ I , both fog nodes FN 1 and FN 2 collaboratively work together to run the following steps:
where E(U .V i ) and E(τ ) have been provided by each IoT device (the step three) and the query user (step one), respectively. Furthermore, we contaminate E(D i ) with a random value w i , to prevent fog node FN 1 from accessing prepared data D i s (the step four):
where w i .w −1 i = 1 mod n.
find out the value c i ∈ {0, 1} and determine whether IoT device I i contributes to the result of aggregate sum. If U .V i ≥ τ , the IoT device will contribute to the final response (setting c i to one); otherwise IoT's contribution will be eliminated by setting c i to zero, i.e., c i = U .V i − τ > 0?1 : 0 (the step five).
should be contaminated by E(α) which has been submitted by query user in the query generation step. Therefore, even by decrypting 1 has not any idea about the final response value (the step six).
-Generate I i ∈{I } (D i ) + α: FN 1 will decrypt the contaminated result receiving from FN 2 and pass it to the user (the step seven). Concretely, the fog nodes' response procedure is outlined in Algorithm 3.
E. RESULT RECOVERY AT THE USER'S SIDE
After receiving I i ∈{I } (D i ) + α, the query user extracts the final subset aggregate value by deducting α from the contaminated response as listed in Algorithm 4.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of the proposed PPSA scheme. Particularly, the privacy of the user's query and each IoT device's response are studied. Although there exist some mature message authentication code techniques or digital signature schemes in the literature to mitigate external active attacks, in this paper, we only focus on the privacy-preserving aspects of the PPSA scheme. Therefore, considering those potential exploits, physical attacks, or any fault injections are beyond the scope of this paper.
• The user's query is privacy-preserving in the proposed PPSA scheme. Apparently, the user's query comprises normalized attribute vector U , threshold value τ , and random contaminator α. To preserve the privacy of U = (u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u k ), the user utilizes Paillier cryptosystem to encrypt each u j in U , i.e., for j = 1, 2, · · · , k we have EU j = E(u j ). Also, Eα = E(α) and Eτ = E(τ ) will be the Paillier encrypted form of α and τ . Since Paillier encryption is indistinguishable under chosen-plaintext attack Algorithm 3 Fog Nodes' Responses // Fog Device FN 2 Input: Vector <EUV i >, Vector <ED i >, Eτ Output: Vector <EUV i T >, Vector <ED i P> Cα ← PAILLIER.ADD(Cα, tmpCW ) 5: end for 6: Cα ← PAILLIER.ADD(Cα, Eα) α : User's contaminator. 
7: return Cα
To be more precise, each entry in V i is homomorphically multiplied by its corresponding encrypted entry in E(U ) and the intermediate results are homomorphically summed up to obtain E(U · V i ). If space [0, δ 1 ] is small, there is a feasibility that fog node FN 2 employs brute force attack on E(U · V i ) by examining all possible values in the space delta 1 k to find V i of each IoT device. To tackle this problem, we apply Paillier's self-blindness property to convert valid ciphertext E(U · V i ) into another indistinguishable yet valid ciphertext for privacy preservation. In other words, by applying a random factor r i , launching brute force attack on
• Intermediate results in fog layer are privacy-preserving in the proposed PPSA scheme.
.E(τ ) −1 and forwards it to FN 1 . However, merely forwarding E(D i ) will let FN 1 decrypt and access the prepared data D i of IoT device I i . Although permuting E(D i ) prevents from disclosing the source from where the data has arrived, it is not sufficient to meet the privacy-preserving requirements of the PPSA scheme. Thereby, random value w i where w i ∈ Z * n , w i .w i −1 = 1 mod n is multiplied by E(D i ), i.e., E(D i ) w i = E(w i .D i ), resulting in privacy-preserving E(D i ). Then, FN 1 decrypts E(U .V i − τ ) into c i to determine whether I i is an element of I . Nevertheless, simply replying C i = E(D i ) c i , reveals c i to FN 2 . Applying random factor t i , self-blinds C i , and C i is therefore privacy-preserving. Finally, FN 2 will homomorphically compute N i=1 C w −1 i i and multiply it by E(α) to contaminate the final result S. Therefore even
).E(α) prevents FN 1 from accessing S, i.e., the final result is privacy-preserving.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we examine the proposed PPSA scheme in terms of communication and computational costs. 1 We will measure the execution time and analyze the communication overhead of each step from the user's query submission up to final contaminated result decryption in FN 2 .
A. COMPUTATIONAL COSTS
In this subsection, we evaluate the computational costs of the proposed PPSA scheme. We have implemented PPSA with Java (JDK 1.8 update 222) on Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4790 CPU @ 3.60GHz, with 32 GB main memory with Ubuntu 16.04 operating system as our experimental platform. The detailed parameter settings are provided in Table 2 . We run our experiments 10 times for different parameter values. The average execution time in each step is illustrated in Fig. 3. Fig. 3(a) depicts the computational cost of the user's query generation for different κ values, i.e., κ = {256, 512, 1024, 2048} and the attribute vector length k varies from 5 to 30 with an increment of 5. Clearly, the computational cost increases when κ becomes more secure and is still linear with k, though for κ = 2048 the computational cost grows more rapidly than κ = 1024, 512, and 256. Fig. 3(b) specifies the computational cost of the IoT device's query response when k = 5, 10, 15, 20, 25, 30. Obviously, when k becomes larger, the response time will increase, but is still relatively small, fitting the IoT devices. For example, for the most secure case in our experiments, with κ = 2048 and k = 30, the IoT's response time is almost 240ms. Fig. 3(c) plots the computational cost of the fog device FN 2 on step four of Fig 2 to calculate E(U·V i −τ )||E(D i ) with respect to N in the range of 50 to 300. Fig. 3(d) depicts the computational cost of the fog device FN 1 to find out the similarity of the attribute vectors by considering the threshold value τ . For the similarity measure, c i = U · V i − τ is examined and E(D i ) c i is calculated by FN 1 . Evidently, this step is the most time-consuming stage due to decrypting E(U · V i − τ ) to obtain c i , however, it is still linear with respect to N . Finally, Fig. 3(e is homomorphically added to α to prevent FN 1 from inferring the final plaintext response I ∈I D . Clearly, the computational cost in this step is linear with N for both κ values. Ultimately, the plot of the seventh step is ignored since it comprises just a single decryption operation.
B. COMMUNICATION OVERHEADS
To preserve the privacy of normalized vectors U = (u 1 , u 2 , · · · , u k ), V i = (v i1 , v i2 , · · · , v ik ), threshold value τ , and the final response value, the user has to send the encrypted U , τ , and α to FN 2 , resulting in the communication cost of (k + 2) · |cp| in the first step, where k is the length of V i and |cp| is the ciphertext length of Paillier PKE. FN 2 will retain both τ and E(α) and broadcast E(U ) to IoT devices, therefore the communication cost in the second phase is k · |cp|. After computing E(U .V i ) = k j=1 E(u j ) v ij in each IoT device I i , E(U .V i ) and encrypted prepared data D i , E(D i ) will be sent back to FN 2 , so the communication cost in the third phase is (1 + 1) · |cp|. For each IoT device I i , random value w i will be generated to calculate E(D i ) = E(D i ) w i . Moreover, E(U · V i − τ ) will be submitted to FN 1 , then the communication overhead of this phase is (N + N ) · |cp|. Next, fog device FN 1 evaluates U .V i − τ to assign 0 or 1 to c i and finally computes C i = E(D ) c i .t i n for each IoT device I i . Obviously, the communication overhead of this step is N · |cp|. In the sixth step,
).E(α) to find the final aggregated value that is also contaminated by α and will forward it to FN 1 for decryption. Evidently, the communication cost for transferring this single ciphertext is 1 · |cp|. In the end, upon receiving the encrypted result, fog node FN 1 will decrypt it to return back the plaintext response to the user. It is worth mentioning that the plaintext result has been contaminated by α; as the user knows the plaintext α, he/she can subtract α to attain the final plaintext result. Clearly, the communication cost of the seventh step is just to transmit the plaintext value from FN 1 to the user. Summarizing the above communication overheads in Table 3 , we can see, due to the collaborative nature of the proposed PPSA, the query response is communication efficient. 
VII. RELATED WORK
Fog-enhanced IoT has received considerable investigation in recent years. In this section, we will take a look into some of the recently published studies in privacy-preserving schemes for fog-enhanced IoT applications.
Proximity detection in crowdsourcing and social networks suffers from not only privacy breaches, but also high computational and communication overhead. To address these concerns, authors in [13] propose a fog-enhanced location difference-based proximity detection protocol, i.e. LoDPD, which exploits the Paillier PKE cryptosystem and the decision-tree theory.
Fast-growing IoT and big data have raised the demand of secure communication, computation as well as storage capabilities in face identification and resolution based appli- cations. Therefore, in [14] , Hu et al. have proposed the privacy-preserving fog computing framework to ensure the privacy and security of the sensitive image data and queries.
The proposed fog-enhanced framework not only meets the requirement for security and privacy preservation, but also improves processing capacity and saves the bandwidth. Dot (Inner) product is one of the widely used algebraic operations that is done quite simply by multiplying each corresponding element of each vector. However, to achieve not only privacy preservation, but also efficient multi-dot product in fog-enhanced IoT, PMQ was proposed by Mahdikhani and Lu in [12] . PMQ utilizes BGN homomorphic encryption to encrypt query request and response to satisfy privacy-preserving k dot-product query in IoT domain, where k indicates the subset of IoT nodes that should respond to the control center. Although the query response O(k) is communication efficient due to the preprocessing conducted by the fog device, the query request can still be improved to preserve privacy.
To address the heterogeneous data aggregation in real IoT applications, a light-weight privacy-preserving data aggregation (LDPA) for the fog-enabled setting was proposed by Lu et al. [15] . Their proposed LPDA is identified by applying Paillier cryptosystem, Chinese Remainder Theorem, and one-way hash chain function to not only aggregate hybrid IoT devices' data, but also early filters the injected false data at the network edge.
To query specific IoT device's data at a specific time slot in the fog-based environment, PQuery [16] and XRQuery [17] were proposed by Yekta and Lu. PQuery is O( 3 √ n) communication efficient privacy-preserving query scheme that is formed by combining two distinctive privacy-enhancing techniques, i.e., privacy information retrieval (PIR) and oblivious transfer, to preserve the privacy for both the end-user and the service provider. Different from the prior study, XRQuery is characterized by employing a new communication-efficient PIR protocol to achieve the same privacy level as PQuery, but with more efficient communication cost, i.e., O(log n).
Later, fog-assisted selective aggregation operation has been studied by Huang et al. [18] . They construct a new threat model to formalize the non-collusive and collusive attacks of compromised fog nodes and demonstrate that the proposed scheme can prevent both misbehaviours. Their proposed privacy-preserving and reliable selective multi-source aggregation scheme is comprised of BCP cryptosystem, randomized message-lock encryption, homomorphic proxyauthenticators, and multi-dimensional aggregation to address the data privacy and reliability challenges.
In [7] , Lu proposed a communication efficient privacypreserving range query scheme in fog-enhanced IoT environment. It employs BGN homomorphic encryption scheme to satisfy privacy constraints in each layer from device layer to fog layer and fog layer to user layer. Lu's scheme archived much lower communication complexity and computational cost compared with straightforward BGN-based PRQwo. It develops a novel decomposition and composition techniques to establish O( √ n) communication efficiency via decomposing a range query of length n into five BGN-encrypted vectors of length √ n. In [19] , Kong et al. proposed a privacy-preserving querying and verifiable scheme in vehicular fog data dissemination, which enables the vehicles as end-users to acquire local data from the roadside units as fog storage devices. The proposed scheme exploits the homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem and forms an invertible matrix to structure multiple data queries from different vehicles and aggregate the ciphertext responses in the fog nodes.
Location-sensitive and latency-aware local data management in a traffic monitoring system have been considered by Li et al. in [20] to propose a privacy-preserving traffic monitoring scheme via fog-enhanced vehicular crowdsensing. In the proposed PSM scheme with false report filtering feature, real-time traffic monitoring which supports data confidentiality and integrity, conditional privacy, and local traffic processing is achieved.
Finally, in [21] , Liu et al. built a fog computing-based smart grid model to achieve privacy-preserving aggregation communication and function query, which can be applied in fog-enhanced IoT solutions. As an underlying building block, they have exploited a double trapdoor decryption cryptosystem to satisfy the additively homomorphic encryption in order to implement data aggregation in fog nodes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed PPSA scheme which is a privacy-preserving subset aggregation protocol in fog-enhanced IoT system. The proposed scheme employs the Paillier homomorphic encryption as a basic building block to encrypt the query request, response, as well as intermediate results to prevent any information disclosure. PPSA provides efficient data aggregation service over a subset of IoT end-devices that hold the most similar vectors to the normalized attribute vectors submitted by the query user. Secure dot product, as a judgment of similarity, is calculated to select a subset of IoT devices. We conduct a security analysis to demonstrate the security and privacy-preservation properties of our scheme. Moreover, our analysis and experimental results show that PPSA performs an acceptable performance in terms of communication overhead and computational cost. Although, the contaminated plaintext response from FN 1 and O(k + 2) in the query request are communication efficient, we will put efforts in reducing the communication cost within the fog layer and apply the proposed scheme to some specific real-world scenarios.
